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The WTO has never been so popular since its last 1999 meeting in Seat-
tler
l 
Many ordinary people, who never heard of it, understood how this 
unknown organisation plays a key role not only for international trade but 
also as a tool for developed and developing countries to fight between 
themselves into the international arena. However if this meeting - which 
was due to start a new round of negotiations - could be considered as a 
failure, this does not mean that all features of the new system are nega-
tive. Among them, the new WTO dispute settlement mechanism is proba-
bly one of the less controversial innovations, even if some amendments 
have been requested by developing countries. 
Many international trade specialists and lawyers have regarded the 
World Trade Organisation as a renewal of the GATT system more than a 
complete change.' However, even if one can agree with this opinion, the 
new dispute resolution mechanism brought enough changes to world 
trade disputes to be recognised as the WTO's most individual contribution 
to stability oj the global economy.' The new mechanism set up by the 
1 Held from the 30 November 1999 until the 3 December 1999. Third WTO Ministerial 
Conference see http://www.wto.org/wto/seattle/englishlibs_e/ibs_e.htm. 
2 See for instance Linda C. Reif 'History of the Uruguay Round' pp 2 sq: Philip Raworth 
'Introduction to the Law of WTO·. pp. 16 sq in The Law oj' WTO. Final Text oj'the GATT 
Uruguay Round Agreements The Practitioner's Deskbook Series Oceana Publications 
1995: B Hoekman & M Kostecki The Political Economy oj' the World Trade system: 
j'rom GATT to WTO Oxford Universiry Press 1995: J Croome Reshaping the World Trade 
System: A History oj'the Uruguay Round WTO publications 1995: Qureshi AH The World 
Trade Organization - Implementing International Trade Norms Manchester University 
Press 1996: E Vermulst B Driessen 'An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement and its 
Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements - Nice on Paper but Too Much Stress 
for the System' Journal oj' World Trade 29 1995 2 pp 131 sq: M. Reisman, M. Wiedman 
'Contextual Imperatives of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms' Journal oj' World Trade 29 
1995 1 pp 5sq. In French: H Ruiz-Fabri 'Le reglement des differends dans Ie cadre de 
l'Organisation mondiale du commerce' Journal du droit international 1997 3 710 sq: E 
Canal-Forgues L 'inslltution de la conciliation dans Ie cadre du GATT. Contribution a {'etude 
de la structuration d'un mecanisme dE' reglement des difj'erends Brussels Bruylant 1993. 











































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
'Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement oj Dis-
putes" has been regarded as the establishment of a 'world trade jurisdic-
tion' aimed to settle disputes on grounds of the rule of law'" 
If some aspects of the new mechanism are directly inspired from the 
evolution of the GATT system, there was a clear intention from its drafters 
to make the process qUicker, more legally orientated and more binding. 
The major changes are twofold: firstly, the memorandum clearly states 
rules and procedures that previously only existed under the GATT system 
as implied or customary rules; secondly it sets up a compulsory system of 
disputes settlement between WTO members offering them an option 
between a diplomatic or a legal solution, but forcing them to comply with 
the requirements of the new organs in case of deadlock. 
The new system has been described' as an audacious one in so far as it 
creates a mechanism shared between classical diplomatic means through 
arbitration or compromise and a compulsory referral to the Dispute Set-
tlement Body (hereinafter DSB) in case of disputes arising within the scope 
of WTO agreements. 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism has now been implemented 
for more than five years'" It was supported by many countries during the 
drafting process,' and criticised (sometimes by the same countries which 
supported its creation) when implemented. According to WTO members. 
it is an improvement on the old GATT mechanism but to which extent 
could it be regarded as introducing a new era in international trade dis-
pute settlement? The aim of this contribution is to evaluate the successful 
character or not of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism through the 
analysis of its procedures and results based on case law heard or settled. 
There is a strong feeling amongst WTO members that the system must be 
really implemented and all forms of disputes must be resolved through 
this general framework. However, references to legal rules to settle dis-
putes are not necessarily sufficient to find a mutually acceptable solution 
between the parties. In a number of cases, the DSB final decision has not 
been fully implemented illustrating what types of difficulties the system 
has to face when the dispute is not only a legal one! 
4 Annex 2 of the WTO Charter. 
5 See E-U. Petersmann The GATTIWTO Dispute Settlement System - International Law, 
International Organizations and Dispute Settlemenr Kluwer International Law 1997; see 
also 0 Palmeter & PC Mavroidis Dispute Setrlement in the World Trade Organisation 
Practice and Procedure The Hague Kluwer 1999. 
6 See For instance former Director-General Renato Ruggiero's declaration op cit Fn 2; E-U 
Petersmann at 182. 
7 On the 1 of February 2000, the State-oF-play of WTO disputes was the Following since 
the 1 of January 1995: 188 complaints notiFied to the WTO (147 on distinct matters), 23 
active cases, 31 Appellate Body and Panel Reports Adopted, 31 settled or inactive cases 
(source http://www. wto. orglwroldisputelbulleti nlhtm). 
8 Including developing countries who played a leading role during the draFting process 
of the new system. See J Croome Reshaping the World Trade System. A history of the 










































THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
1 THE ORIGIN OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
MECHANISM: THE GATT SYSTEM AND ITS EVOLUTION 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism only constitutes a part of the 
world trade reform initiated through the Uruguay Roundo but has 
one of its key issues. The new system can be regarded as a reaction 
against the inefficiency of the past one regarding the binding effect of 
decisions made by the GATT council. The new one is aimed at building a 
new relationship between WTO members based on a more equal status 
through a unique application of the rule of law. 
1 .1 Key features of the GATT resolution dispute mechanism 
The WTO dispute resolution mechanism is not a creation of its own but 
the result of an improvement of the former GATT system. During the 
1980s, this latter evolved to introduce a more legal approach of interna-
tional trade disputes. The GATT, created in 1948 as a consequence of the 
failure of the International Trade Organisation, moved from a purely 
'diplomatic and negotiated' system to a more 'legally orientated' one. 
However this system remained shared between 'diplomatic' and 'legal' 
means. Legal aspects were used to give a dispute a more objective analy-
sis but did not lead to a compulsory decision. The contracting parties had a 
choice to adhere or not to the dispute settlement principles.' 
Dealing with core articles XXII and XXIII of the amended GATT,' the 
dispute settlement mechanism was based on a two procedure: 
9 Even if this contribution only focuses on the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. the 
Marrakech Agreement signed on the 15 April 1995 establishing the World Trade 
Organisation is made with the WTO agreement and four annexes: annex I A is dedi-
cated to Multilateral Agreements on Trade and Goods and comprises the GATT 1994 (in-
cluding itself the GA IT 19471 and other revised agreements from the Tokyo Round. 
annex I B is dedicated to General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS)' annex I C is 
dedicated to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS)' annex 2 is dedicated LO the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), annex 3 is dedicated to Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
(TPRM) and annex 4 to Plurilateral Trade Agreements (optional The Final 
Ace embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral NegotwtlOns com-
prises three components: the WTO Agreement. the Ministenal Declarations and Decisions. 
the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services 
10 For a more detailed analysis of this system and irs evolution see P Pescatore. WJ Davey 
AF Lowenfeld Handbook of the GATT Dispute Settlement MeChanism KluwerlTaxation 
Publishers 1991, P Pescatore 'The GATT Dispute Setrlement Mechanism Its Present 
Situation and its Prospects' journal of World Trade 27 1993 I pp 5 sq: E Canal-Forgues & 
R Ostrihansky 'New Developments in the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures' journal 
of World Trade 24 19902 pp 67 sq. 
11 This system. also called 'GATT a la carte' (E-U Petersmann at 178) allowed the parries to 
choose their disputE' settlement between the original general GATT system or through 
the Tokyo Hound Dispute Settlement Mechanisms. 
12 Amended through the Tokyo Round 28 November 1979 'Understanding Regarding 
Consultation. Dispute Settlement and Surveillance (U4907) with its annex 
Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute' the Min-
isterial Decision of 29 :-.Jovember 1982 on Dispute Settlement Procedures the 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
firstly. the parties had to investigate a possible friendly settlement through 
bilateral negotiations (called 'consultations'); secondly. in case of failure of 
this option. they had the opportunity to either require the mediation of 
the Director-General or call to the High Contracting Parties" for a working 
group staffed with representatives of each party. The working group had 
then to establish a report on the dispute. 14 As other GATT members could 
be interested, the report was considered as an opinion on the relevant 
matter but not directly and automatically enforceable. It had to be re-
ferred back to the Council of Representatives (the GATT Executive) for 
approvaL 15 
Parties to a dispute requested an alternative solution to the working 
group procedure: the panel of experts. This option was more dedicated to 
the dispute resolution and only focused on a precise matter. The creation 
of a panel was called by the parties through the council of representatives 
and made up of three to five independent experts. The proceedings were 
closer to judicial or contentious ones than with the working group proce-
dure: written and oral submissions. research for a possible friendly set-
tlement and. in case of failure, a panel report set up on legal grounds. The 
report was referred back to the council of representatives, which was the 
only body able to give effect to the findings of the report. Practically 
speaking the council was able to take various measures such as making 
recommendations to lifting one party's obligations. Except for some 
contentious features, this mechanism was closer to a conciliation mecha-
nism as the panel of experts' report was only an advisory opinion
1b 
1.2 Controversial results of the GATT dispute resolution 
mechanism 
The panel mechanism in the GATT system has been regarded as a quali-
fied success for several reasons. On the negative side, many panel reports 
were not adopted or implemented and the number of referrals dramati-
cally increased during the past ten years of this system. 17 This led to a 
lengthening of the duration of the proceedings. Another criticism lied on 
the appointment and lack of independence of experts. Until the middle 
Decision of the High Contracting Parries 30 November 1984 on Dispute Settlement Pro-
cedures (Ll5752). the High Contracting Parries Decision adopted in Geneva 12 April 
1989 on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures. These texts 
are reproduced in Analytical Index: Guide to GA TT Law and Practice vol 2 WTO 1995 pp 
632-642. 
13 That is to say all GATT members. 
14 Third parries were allowed to intervene as the dispute was regarded as an objective 
question. 
15 Even though the report had no compulsory effect and was regarded as an advisory 
opinion. 
16 Some scholars are of the opinion that the way the proceedings were handled and 
the parties felt bound by the report was closer to arbitration (judicial approach) than 
conciliation (political approach). However, this has proved to be more para-judicial con-
ciliation than arbitration. 










































THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
1980s, the original appointment was made through representatives of the 
ministry of Foreign Affairs (secretaries or trade counsellors) acting through 
directives and recommendations of the GATT secretariar. 8 On the positive 
side, the number of disputes resolved through the panel mechanism 
increased considerably, I; illustrating the need for such a procedure. How-
ever, one of the main defects of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism 
laid in the total duration of the panel of expert's procedure (an average of 
13 months) and in an incomplete reliability on the system. The United 
States of America even changed their opinion: after having called for 'less 
legal rules and a more diplomatic approach', they claimed for clearer 
trade rules and sanctions for their violations. 
Another interesting feature of the GATT dispute settlement system lay 
in the range of possible measures available against a contracting party in 
case of violation of its obligations, Under article XXIII. 2, three types of 
remedies where made available: recommendations, rulings and suspen-
sion of obligations, If a decision-making power was granted to the GATT 
General Council, this power was rather dedicated to find a mutually 
acceptable solution than adopting a sanction against one party20 The 
GATT system was aimed primarily to reset normal trade relations by 
asking one of the parties to withdraw its measures, when conflicting with 
GATT obligations, or to behave accordingly to its commitments. Even a 
suspension of obligations as a cross-retaliation measure was aimed at 
restoring the normal situation, 
The GATT dispute resolution system was in fact a victim of its incom-
plete evolution and transformation. If the twofold mechanism of 'diplo-
matic and legal approach' was not really challenged as it left open an 
option to settle disputes between the parties, the binding effect of panel 
reports was too difficult to reach to make the system efficient, To reach it, 
the Council oj Representatives had to adopt it through the so-called proce-
dure of 'positive consensus', which means that the report would only be 
binding if all members from the Council oJ Representatives would accept it 
One refusal could consequently lead giving the panel report the simple 
status of a legal opinion, On a practical point of view, many reports were 
not adopted, especially when the trade dispute involved a high degree of 
political considerations. One of the best examples in that regard is proba-
bly the Banana case involving South American producing countries and 
the European Community regarding the imports and licensing system of 
bananas on the european market. This dispute started under the GATT 
system and led to two panel reports that were never adopted. 21 
18 This appointment procedure has been changed from the middle of the I 980s leading to 
the appointment of non-governmental experts 
19 See E-U Petersmann. The GA TTIWTO Dispute Settlement System at 95-106 giving 
examples of panel reports between 1982 and 1994, 
20 See E-U Petersmann The GATTIWTO Dispute Settlement System at 74. 
21 European Communities, Imports and Sales of Bananas into Member States OS 32/R (not 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY li DEVELOPMENT 
The GATT system called for its own reform. This was partly done 
through the decision taken on 12 April 1989 on the improvement of rules 
and proceedings of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism that pre-
pared the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes of 1994. During the negotiation process started in 
1987, an agreement was quickly reached between the parties regarding 
procedural improvements to be made,n especially the duration of the 
procedure. However, some other features of the dispute settlement re-
mained highly controversial, especially the debate over the legal or diplo-
matic approach of the new dispute settlement mechanism." This explains 
why the new system could be regarded as a renewal of the former one 
although directly linked to it. 
2 THE NEW SYSTEM: THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
UNDERSTANDING 
The very reason for a renewal of the system is to be found through the 
necessary linkage between the WTO agreement and its annexes on one 
hand and the dispute resolution mechanism on the other hand. WTO 
members have to accept a package-deal including the WTO agreement 
plus the first three annexes. As the DSU is part of this system, a member 
state has to accept it. This seems similar to the previous GATT system 
except that the new DSU entrenches compulsory mechanisms imposed 
on member states in case of deadlock of a dispute resolution, 
The new mechanism can be described as using the same features for 
the first stage procedure than the GATT system except the proceedings 
cannot be blocked or delayed anymore, Then the second original aspect 
lies in a possible rehearing of the case on legal issues by the Appellate 
Body. This system is still managed by a general body representing mem-
ber states, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), but acting on the basis of 
the inverted principle called the 'negative consensus': only a unanimous 
vote against the adoption of a panel of experts' report can lead to its 
rejection. 
22 See J Croome A History oj the Uruguay Round at 147-148 
23 See J Croome ib id at 149 'Some Countries led by thE' United States but supported by 
Canada and others. saw the task Cit dispute settlement as being to establish right and wrong' 
to deliver a legal judgment with which the losing party ought obviously to comply . . ' Other 
Countries. however. with the European Community and Japan prominent among them. saw 
dispute settlement under article XXIII as essentially an extension at the concihatton process 
under articie XXII. with the aim less on reaching legal judgments than to overcome a par-
ticular trade problem', 
24 See article iI:2 of the WTO Agreement: the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement at Disputes in Annex 2 is an 'integral part ot this agreement. 
binding on all Members' 
25 This rule inverts the one applied under the GATT system. It makes it nearly impossible 
to oppose a report from a panel or the appellate body as one of the parties (the losing 
one) will probably oppose the final report. This makes the DSB decisions merely formal. 










































THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGAN1SATION 
2.1 Object and objectives of the system 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is characterised by three main 
principles deriving directly from its subsidiarity. diversity. balance. 
Firstly. this mechanism is governed by the idea of subsidiarity meaning 
that any friendly solution (mutually acceptable solution)c7 must be preferred 
to a legal or conventional settlement. This can be illustrated through the 
'consultations' procedure which purpose is to avoid a discussed matter to 
becoming a dispute. This can also be checked through the panel and the 
appeal procedures. 2" a panel or the Appellate Body must promote the 
promotion of a mutually acceptable solution. Only in case of failure, will 
they make their own recommendations. The DSU system is still based on 
the idea of conciliation 31 This can be regarded as a mixed system, half 
conciliatory/half contentious where political aspects are still included. 
Secondly, the dispute settlement system is an exclusive and unitary 
but with several alternative procedures. This principle is clearly 
stated in article 23.1 of the DSU. Any other types of dispute resolution, 
including the ordinary ones in public international law are unsuitable 
(including the ICJ). This also means for instance that any unilateral meas-
ure is not WTO compatible. Another feature confirming this exclusive 
character is to be found in article 5 of the DSU offering parties wishing to 
settle their dispute throu$h appropriate offices. mediation or conciliation 
of the Director-GeneraI.3~ These procedures can be used separately or 
jointly with the panel of experts . However they should preferably 
be initiated during the consultation proceedings before the establishment 
of a panel of experts. The exclusive character of the dispute settlement 
does not prevent the possibility to refer to arbitration
j
·, This arbitration 
process must be expeditious, based on mutual consent of the parties and 
refer to clearly defined issues. All traditional features of arbitration are 
applicable: the process should be led on a basis and the parties must 
abide by the arbitration award. 
26 See article} General Provisions of the OSU. 
27 See article 4 Consultations of the OSU. 
28 See E-U Petersmann The GATTIWTO Dispute Settlement System m 182 and the compara-
tIve table of Political me[hods of disputl? settlemem and Legal me[hods of dispute seU/ement. 
29 See Article 12 Panel Procedures of the OSU 
}O See Article 19. This text also applies to the Appellate Body. 
31 However. one of the main differences With the GATT system lies in the inverted 
procedure for the adoption of the reports of panels of experts. Knowing that the repons 
are to be adopted. the parties will probably not have the same atritude 
32 See E-U Petersmann The CATTIWTO Dispute Serrlement System at 178. 
33 Actually. the WTO Director-General is not the only one to be able to offer these facili-
ties. Article 5.6 of the OSU provides: 'The Director-General may. f!f[er good offices. 
conciliation or mediarion wi[h [he view to assisting members to sl?ule a disputl? This allows 
for an extensive interpretation including the appointment by the parties of any other 
person on whom they agreed to settle their disputes through this mean 
34 Article 25. According [Q I Brownlie Principles of PubliC international Law OUP 5 ed 1998 
at 705 "In recen! times thl? distinction between arbi[ralion and iudicial settlement has be-
come formal. . The contrasts are principally these. tht're is more flexibility [han there is 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Thirdly, the WTO dispute system is balanced in its results. The violation 
of an obligation by one party will lead to the withdrawal of an advantage 
granted to the other. The aim is to preserve members obligations and to 
compensate losses in case of violation of the agreements. The dispute 
settlement mechanism is open to any form of diminution of commercial 
advantages. However, in such cases the withdrawal is never compulsory. 
This illustrates how the ideas of 'compromise' and 'balance' are central to 
this mechanism. Moreover, sanctions to the violation of an agreement are 
not primarily aimed at granting compensation to the winning party but to 
re-establish normal trade relations between them.'5 It also has to be noted 
that according to the DSU, no interim measures can be granted. That will 
encourage the parties to bargain if an urgent solution is needed. 
The idea of balance entrenched in the DSU is not contradictory with the 
reinforcement of a more legal approach of international trade disputes. 
Legal procedures are used as a means to avoid a deadlock between par-
ties. The legal approach of the DSU is a progressive one: only if all 
non-legal means have failed, will the rule of law be the reference to settle 
a dispute. This could be observed for instance when one compares a 
panel report with an appellate body report. Although the appellate body is 
only allowed to deal with legal arguments, a panel of experts may use 
legal and non-legal arguments in its findings. 
The rule of law is therefore at the core of WTO dispute settlement, not to 
compensate violations of WTO obligations but to preserve the balance of the 
system. It must be added that if international custom~ry or conventional rules 
of interpretation are applicable to WTO disputes,3c the DSB should normally 
be limited to the implementation of existing rules and is not allowed to create 
rules adding or retrenching members' rights or obligations." 
2.2 The scope of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
The scope of the new system has been defined by the DSU in three ways 
namely: temporal, material and personal. 
Firstly, the new system has only been applicable after the entry into 
force of WTO agreements. Only complaints lodged after the implementa-
tion of the WTO Charter have been examined under the new system." A 
35 Only interim compensation can be awarded until the withdrawal of the challenged 
measure. Article 23.1 states however: "When members seek the redress of a violation 
... " This could include compensation. 
36 See for the 1 969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and for instance: Venezuela 
& Brazil v United States (Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline) WTIDS 2 
& 4 (Appellate Body 1996 at 19); United States v India (Patent Protection for Pharmaceuti-
cal and Agricultural Products) WTIDS 50 (Appellate Body 1997 at § 46): Canada & United 
States v European Community (Measures affecting Livestock and Meat (Hormones) WTIDS 
26 & OS 48 (Appellate Body 1998 at § 124) 
37 See articles 32 and 19:2 of the OSU, see also United States v India (Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Products) WT/OS 50 (Appellate Body 1997 at § 46) 
38 See for instance: The Philippines v Brazil (Measures affecting desiccated Coconut) WTIDS 
22 (Appellate Body 1997 at 23) where the Appellate Body reminded that according to 
[he principle set out in article 28 of the Vienna Convention, there cannot be a retroac-










































THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
number of dispute settlements initiated under the GATT system were 
examined under a transitional one but with a twofold limit. In the first 
instance, a dispute heard under the GATT system cannot be re-examined 
under the WTO one: the rule non bis in idem applies. In the second 
instance, some GATT members preferred to withdraw their complaints under 
the former system to restart the same proceedings under the new one.'c 
This illustrates the continuity and the complementarity of the two systems. 
Secondly, the material scope of the WTO understanding is based on the 
idea of unity. This means that the strength of the new system derives 
from the application of the dispute settlement mechanism to any dispute 
referred in the framework of WTO agreements. Unlike the previous GATT 
system where the parties chose to adhere or not to adhere to the various 
agreements of the Tokyo Round, the new dispute settlement system is 
unified" Strictly speaking, this will include the multilateral trade 
ments, such as goods, services, intellectual property, the WTO 
agreement and the understanding itself. Only commercial poliCies are out 
of the scope of the Convention. 
The understanding is also applicable to other optional plurilateral trade 
agreements included in annex 4. However, the OSU will only be applied 
between parties to these agreements There are also some specific proce-
dures considered as sensitive areas or politically difficult. This'is for in-
stance the case of related to dumping or subventions. 
The general scope of the DSU does not prevent the application of spe-
cific rules included in defined (and often technical) agreements (like 
textiles and clothing, sanitary and phytosanitary measures).". These 
specific rules get priority on general DSU rules" establishing a hierarchy 
between the two. However these derogations are aimed to facilitate 
disputes settlement with qualified technical expertise (for example the 
field of subventions or financial services) or to provide specific mecha-
nisms (in case of dumping for instance) that will increase the efficiency of 
the dispute resolmion. 
There is however a possible competition between general DSU rules 
and those specific rules, which can generate some difficulties or clashes. 
The chairperson of the OSB has to decide which rule is applicable (within 
10 days) but special rules have the priority over general rules
q 
Thirdly, the personal scope of the DSU is limited to interstate disputes. As 
a consequence of the unity principle mentioned above, each WTO mem-
ber is party to the OSU. Two remarks should be made. Firstly, only a 
39 Article 3. 1 1 of the DSU 
40 See for instance India v Poland (Import Regime for Automobiles) WTIDS 19 (mutually 
agreed solution 1996): Venezuela <'it Brazil v United States (Standardsfor Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline) WTIDS 2 & 4 (Appellate Body 1996) 
41 See E-U Petersmann The GATTfWrO Dispute Settlement System ar 178. 
42 The special or additional rules and procedures contained in the covered agreements are 
listed in the appendix 2 of the DSU. 
43 Article 1.2 of the DSU. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
member state is entitled to refer a dispute in the framework of the DSU.45 
Secondly, special procedures may be applied to disputes between a 
developed country and a developing country: article 5 on good offices, 
mediation and conciliation, article 6 on the establishment of panels, 
article 12 on panel procedures. These procedures are completed by a 
possible extension of deadlines for consultations or for the establishment 
of the panel report and by the compulsory obligation to state reasons in 
the panel report why a specific or more favourable regime is granted to a 
developing country. An even more favourable regime is granted to the 
least-developed countries. A dispute has preferably to be settled through 
good offices, mediation or conciliation. The panel mechanism is regarded 
as the last chance option, and developed countries are asked to refrain 
from using the dispute settlement mechanism when it involves a least 
developed country. 
2.3 New Features of the DS~ procedure 
The new features of the new system are based on two main ideas: a 
decision-making process close to a compulsory mechanism; a more 
clearly codified procedure especially regarding time limits. 
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), staffed with WTO general council 
members, is the central organ of the new system. In all types of settle-
ment, including those made under specific agreements, the DSB plays the 
key-role by making decisions through the principle of consensus·' This 
rule should have been closed to the former GATT system if article 16.3 
and 16.4 would not have inverted the consensus-making process for the 
adoption of panel reports:
7 
This change is a major one and probably the 
key explanation of the efficiency of the new system. Even if appealed, the 
panel reports are not threatened anymore by a possible non-adoption and 
deadlock when one of the parties wanted to oppose the panel report. 
Actually, if the word 'consensus' is still used, on a practical point of view 
chances for the DSB to oppose either a panel report or an appellate body 
report are very limited. This derives from the negotiation process and could 
be seen as a compromise between those who wanted a more judicial 
45 Meaning the 'Federal Clause' (ie a provision of a treaty only binds the federation and 
not the states belonging to the Federation) does not apply. However, member states can 
be represented by private persons acting on their behalf during the proceedings (see 
Ecuador. Guatemala. Honduras. Mexico and the USA v the European Communities (Regime 
Jor the Importation. Sale and Distribution of Bananas) (WT/DS 27) (Appellate Body 1997 
at § 11 sq). 
46 Article 2.4 of the DSU. 
47 Article 2.4 note 1 provides: 'The DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a 
matter submitted Jor its consideration, if no member present at the meeting oj the DSB 
when the decision is taken, Jormally objects to the proposed decision' but the combination 
of article 16.3 and 16.4 creates what has been called the 'negative consensus' meaning 
that the adoption of a panel report could only be rejected in case of full agreement of all 
WTO members. As article 16.3 provides that the views of parties to a dispute shall be 
taken into consideration and fully recorded. the adoption of a report will be quasi-










































THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHAN1SM OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
approach of international trade disputes48 and those who the 
consensus principle as the only acceptable one:' 
The second DSU key aspect lies in the procedures applicable to dis-
putes, Formerly. international trade disputes were seen as only being 
resolved through diplomatic and non-compulsory rules, The new architec-
ture of the system has been made through a better codification of appli-
cable rules. especially regarding time limits applicable to each of the 
procedure so This timetable is not only the result of lessons and criticisms 
from the GATT system but has been codified through the DSU as a com-
pulsory system, It will take a case in the new system. depending on a 
possible appeal procedure, between one to a maximum of two years, 
Following the time limits reshaping, another key feature is the creation 
of a new independent organ in to review panel reports if requested 
by a party, The appellate body is not just the duplication of the panel of 
experts or a kind of 'super panel of experts' it is also an independent body 
in charge to review on exclusively grounds the panel report This is 
similar to a rehearing of the case in the judicial sense, According to the 
number of panel reports modified through this procedure, this new fea-
ture can be regarded as a guarantee for the parties to get their arguments 
reheard on a more jurisdictional approach, 
The above are the key features of the new system, Their application could 
be described through the different of the procedure, 
3 PHASES OF THE DISPUTES SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
The presentation of the dispute settlement mechanism can be divided into 
three phases:" consultations, panel report and appeal and implementation 
of the DSB decision, Each one shares common principles but is imple-
mented within its specific aim, 
3.1 First stage procedure: Consultations and panel report 
The first stage procedure can be described as the most diplomatic one, If 
a dispute is to be settled, all non-contentious means should be used to 
avoid a deadlock and the parties always have the possibility of reaching 
an acceptable solution through mediation, conciliation or arbitration, 
Innovations for the first stage procedure are mainly twofold: precise time 
limits and reshaping of procedures regarding competence, expertise and 
impartiality of the experts, 
Consultation is the first step of the dispute settlement. Consultation is 
a preliminary requirement to the establishment of a panel of experts," 
48 Mainly the United States and Canada, 
49 Mainly the European Union. Japan and developing countries, 
50 See See E-U Petersmann The GA TTIWTO Dispute Seftlement 
51 Three procedure because the implementation 
the DSU. stage still seems to be the weakest one 
52 Article 4 of the DSU 
53 Article 6 of the DSU. 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY 6. DEVELOPMENT 
illustrating once again the importance of the conciliation procedure. When 
one party requires consultations. the other one has ten days to reply and 
thirty days to implement them. 54 Remaining silent for one party is not 
anymore a way to escape or delay the procedure. 
Consultations are not only a formal requirementSS but allows a better 
analysis of the admissibility of the case and frames its legal basis. For 
instance. if the request is too vague or not sufficiently determined. a redefi-
nition of the case can be requested. This happened in a case involving Brazil 
and Canada regarding the financial programme of aircraft producrsSt 
Consultations also allow the participation of third countries to the pro-
cedure, provided the parties to the dispute on their involvement 
(veto power). Third countries must however a substantial trade 
interest in order to be involved in such a consultation. 
Consultations cannot be used to delay the dispute settlement. If the 
deadliness is reached without a mutually acceptable solution. the panel 
mechanism can be activated. 
Since 1995, a number of consultations led to a dispute settlement with-
out further intervention. Consultations are also directed to keep confi-
dential the reasons of the settlement: if the result has to be communicated 
to the DSB, the content of consultations remains confidential. This should 
favour a solution through consultations. 
The establishment of a panel of experts is a second step. Its creation 
does not emanate from a mutual demand from both parties but from the 
complaining party.bC The establishment of the panel is decided by the DSB 
at its first meeting after the demand. The request shall include the chal-
lenged specific measures and provide a brief summary of the legal basis 
of the complaint. Acmally the complaining party will decide upon the 
coment of the demand: it can define the terms of reference." which 
determines the mission to be fulfilled by the panel. 
54 Except if provided or accepted otherwise by the parties 
55 They must be notified to the dispute settlement body. 
56 Canada v Brazil (Export Financing Programme Jor Aircraft) WTIDS 46 (Appellate Body 
1999) 
57 This actually happened when Australia and New Zealand asked to be involved in the 
discussions related to the hormones case (Canada 0( United States v European Community 
(Measures affecting Livestock and Meat (Hormones) WTIDS 26 6. OS 48 (Appellate Body 
1998) and when the EU asked to be involved in the consultations between the USA and 
Japan regarding the sound records case (United States and the European Communities v Japan 
(Measures concerning Sound Recordings) WTIDS 28 . WTIDS 42 (mutual agreement 1997) 
58 It can be a 30 days deadline. a 60 days one or a specifically defined one (by the parties 
themselves). 
59 See the complete list at http://www.wto.orglwtoldisputelbulletin.htm. 
60 Article 6. I of the DSU. 
61 There is a possibility for the DSB to reject by consensus the estabhshment of the pane\. 
but as a matter of fact. the working process of the consensus (the negative consensus) IS 
theoretical. as at least the complaining party would sllch a deCision. 
62 Standards terms of reference define the ordinary to the panel but [he 
applicant may ask for special terms of reference meaning mandate can be extended 
if requested. 
63 A panel is not entitled to reshape the established terms of references and cannot modify 
the argumems of the parties: see Ecuador. Guatemala. Honduras. Mexico and the USA v 










































THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
The establishment of a panel usually consists of three ex pens 0' A major 
change within the DSU lies in the request for impartiality of the 
This was adopted in reaction against former GATT practices, Article 8,1 of 
the DSU states that experts shall be officials or individuals of a member 
state, well-qualified and recognised for their competencies in the field of 
international trade, Article 8.2 provides that panel members should be 
selected with a view to ensuring independence oj the members. a suJJiciently 
diverse background and a wide spectrum oj experience. The independence 
of has been regarded as a key guarantee regarding the reliability 
of the system. Moreover experts shall not have, except if agreed 
otherwise by the parties themselves, the nationality of one of them.o5 The 
DSB secretariat holds an indicative list of experts. The secretariat is also 
allowed to make propositions of experts that parties to the dispute shall 
agree within twenty days, In case of disagreement, the Director-General 
will, within ten days, appoint the panel. 
Regarding the mission of the panel of experts, a mandate is usually 
granted through 'standard terms of reference'"' but the parties are al-
lowed, within twenty days, to redefine these terms and grant the panel 
special terms of references. Terms of references are compulsory but the 
parties are able to modify them. This confirms the negotiated role granted 
to the panel of ev,",errc 
Third parties with a substantial interest in the dispute are allowed to 
intervene through written communications. They are informed of the first 
communications of the parties and may join the complaint and participate 
to the panel's work. This is a new feature of the DSU. According to cases 
and disputes since 1995, such a feature will playa key role in the devel-
opment of the DSU practice. 
In keeping with the same idea of rationalisation, everything is made to 
facilitate the junclion of complaints related to the same matter. Several 
junctions have already been made. 
Rules of procedure are set out in Appendix 3 of the DSU. As with other 
features of the new system, they are clear bur fleXible." The first rule is 
represented by the establishment of a timetable giving deadlines for 
the European Communities (RegIme for the Importation. Sale and Distribution of Bananas) 
(WTIDS 27) (Appellate Body 1997 at § 144) 
64 Five if requested. 
65 This principle applies in the case of a custom union. which means a serious reduction of 
possibilities of choices. 
66 They are also allowed to make their own propositions. 
67 As provided in article 7.1 Terms of Panels of the DSU. Standard terms of 
references could be compared [0 the in which the DSB will operate. These 
terms will give a picture of rhe dispute to avoid the panel from broading [he dispute. 
68 The Intervention of third parries in dispute resolutions can actually transform the 
balance of the as some WTO members (mainly developing countries) are 
scarcely these proceedings. as third parry gives them an opportunity 
[0 intervene witholJ[ having to initiate the process. 











































LAW. DEMOCRACY &. DEVELOPMENT 
written communications and answers to communications. This will 
ensure no delay in the panel's work. 
A second rule lies in respect of procedural principles. The procedure 
before the panel must be contradictory and inquisitorial allowing the 
panel to lead the preparatory inquiries of the case, the parties to be heard 
and their reply to each other.?1 A panel of expens is also entitled to ask for 
further information or technical opinions and even refer technical ques-
tions to other experts or group of experts. 
Two other main rules characterise the procedure before the panel The 
first one is transparency: each party (even third party) must be able to 
obtain the relevant information from the other party. The second one, in 
contrast to previous one. is confidentiality. The conciliation between the 
two rules leads to a for confidentiality but with the obligation to 
provide a minimum information that can be communicated to the public. 
Appendix 3 of the DSU provide a balance of these two antagonists princi-
ples protecting rights of the (including third parties) while granting 
the panel means close to those belonging to a jurisdiction. 
Once hearings have taken the panel will issue the descriptive 
sections (factual and arguments) of its draft report to both sides. giving 
them an opportunity to comment. This draft report does not include 
findings and conclusions. The interim report will be issued later on after 
a set period of time, integrating findings and conclusions of the panel. The 
parties will then have a short period of time'< in which to make written 
submiSSions on aspects of the interim report they want to have reviewed 
before the writing of the final report. The interim report can be followed 
by an attempt to continue with the conciliation process. Moreover. the 
complaining party can ask for a suspension of the work done by the panel 
of experts if it feels that a mutually acceptable solution can be reached." 
This interim stage review could be compared to a mixing of conciliation 
and arbitration procedures. The panel system tries to keep the discussion 
open between the parties, knowing that it will issue a proposed solution in 
case of failure. It could be compared to a conCiliatory body able to be-
come an arbitral tribunal. However. this is not completely true as the 
parties are still able to refer non-legal arguments. 
The final report will vary according to the existence or the lack of a mu-
tually acceptable solution. In the first case, the final report will simply 
70 Appendix 3 provides a precise calendar and time limits for the different steps of the 
procedure. But the parties themselves, as stated above. can amend this calendar. 
71 In case of several complainants, article 9 of the DSU provides (he pOSSibility for the 
unique panel to draft several distinct reports for each complainant (even in the case of a 
joint compiaim). 
72 Rules are however strict as set out in appendix 4. Nothing can apparently prevent a 
panel of experts to refer some questions to NGOs as experts. 
73 Appendix 3.10 of the DSU. 
74 Article 14 and appendix 3.3 of the DSU. 
75 Article 15.1 of the DSU. 
76 Usually one week. 
77 Article 15.2 of [he DSU. 










































THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
summarise the dispute and state that a mutual agreement has been 
reached. In the second case, the report will include the descriptive sec-
tions as well as the findings and conclusions of the panel of experts. 
The report of the panel must be adopted by the DSB. The panel of ex-
perts must deliver its report within six months. The DSB adopts it at least 
twenty days after the report has been distributed to DSB members but 
with a deadline of sixty days. This clearly means that the report must be 
adopted, provided the adoption is made under the process of 
consensus (solution which will be very difficult to reach as at least one of 
the parties will normally accept the report as it will be in its faVOUr). The 
only way to avoid an immediate decision by the DSB is for one party to 
appeal the panel report before the appellate body as set up in article 16.4 
of the DSU. 7
0 
3.2 Second stage: The appeal mechanism 
The appeal mechanism is a brand new feature of the DSU. Its duration is 
between sixty and ninety days and is probably the more judicial aspect of 
the new as the appellate body only reviews panel reports on a 
legal basis. 
The first innovation lies in the creation of a permanent appellate body. 
Members are appointed by the DSB on proposals made by the Director-
General of the WTO, the chairperson of the DSB and the chairpersons of 
the general council and the sectors councils. It is staffed with seven mem-
bers appointed for four years. renewable once. These members broadly 
represent the diversity of WTO membership. They are completely inde-
pendent (from any government) and their competencies must be recog-
nised. 
The appellate body only reviews the panel report on legal issues. S! As 
article 17.6 only issues of law and legal interpretations devel-
oped by the panel are reviewable. The powers of the appellate body are 
similar to those granted to a Court of Appeal: the decision held will substi-
tute the panel report. However. the appellate body cannot interfere with 
the descriptive part of the report. Only the legal reasoning held by the 
panel of experts through its report can be challenged. This will obviously 
encourage the panel of experts to be sure of their legal reasoning and 
justifications of their decisions. Since 1995, a number of cases heard by 
panel reports have been appealed." It appears from its 'jurisprudence' 
that the appellate body is often obliged to rebuild or to reinterpret the 
legal reasoning of the panel reports." This however does not mean a 
79 In which case. the adoption of a decision by the DSB is suspended 
80 The first seven members was appointed in 1995. They are nationals from: the USA. 
New Zealand. Germany. the Philippines, Uruguay. Japan Of the seven judges. 
three had a two years because of a turnover every two years. 
81 Article 17.6 of the DSU. 
82 26 reports circulated at the end of 1999. 
83 See for instance European Communities. Canada and United States v japan (Taxes on 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
change in the final decision but mainly a reshaping of legal arguments 
demonstrating the weakness of some panel reports. 
Only the parties to a dispute are entitled to challenge the panel report 
before the appellate body. However. third parties are entitled to make 
written submissions once the appeal is lodged if they demonstrate a 
substantial interest in the procedure. s4 
Like the other stages of the dispute settlement. the appeal procedure is 
characterised by a precise timetable and guarantees of confidentiality. 
impartiality and integrity. Specific rules for the appeal procedure have 
been set Up85 
Only three members of the appellate body sit for an appeal. There are 
no specific rules regarding the manner of designating members. which 
means that a national can participate as member of the appellate body 
until there is no possibility for the other party to appoint an ad hoc mem-
ber like before the International Court of Justice (lCJ). 
The other features of the appeal procedure are described in the working 
procedures documents implementing the general rules set up in articles 
II. 17.10 and 18 of the DSU: all sessions and works of the appellate body 
are confidential as well as written communications between the parties. 
The appellate body drafts its report considering all information and decla-
rations. The reports of the appellate body are anonymous. Dissenting 
opinions are not allowed. 
Like the panel report. the appellate body report has to be adopted by 
the DSB to become a binding decision. The report is adopted within thirty 
days of its distriburion except if there is a negative consensus against it. 8c 
That clearly means that if the panel report is modified or reversed by the 
appellate body report. the last one will be compulsory. 
The appellate system under the DSU is close to a judicial review in its 
nature. Meanwhile the panel report is conciliation orientated. while the 
appellate report is more arbitration orientated. Due to the quasi-automatic 
adoption of the reports by the DSB. the second stage procedure can be 
qualified as a more legal approach to the trade dispute. However, that 
does not mean a better result for the parties, as the appellate body will 
only review legal aspects of the dispute. 
The activity of the appellate body during the five past years demon-
strates how WTO members considers legal procedures as a safety guard 
of their interests. Amongst the cases heard, most of them succeeded to 
find a settlement. Actually, the appeal stage could be compared to a 
confirmation of the interpretation on the trade agreements. This does not 
mean these interpretations cannot be critised. 
84 See Article 17.4 of the DSU. 
85 Working procedures drawn up by the appellate body adopted on the 15/02196 and 
amended on the 28/02/97. 
86 There is however little chance to reach such a consensus for the reasons mentioned 










































THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION 
3.3 Third stage: Implementation of the report 
The last - but not least new feature of the DSU can also be compared to 
the execution of judicial decisions. To become efficient, the new system 
has to monitor the effects of the DSB decisions. According to the DSU 
practice for the five past years. the implementation phase is not only the 
conclusion of the dispute settlement mechanism. but a means for unsatis-
fied parties to continue to oppose the decision held by the DSB. 
Article 21 of the DSU sets up direct rules for the implementation of the 
DSB decisions: Within 30 days after the adoption of the the 
member concerned shall inform the DSB of its intention in respect of the 
implementation of the recommendations and rulings. When difficulties to 
comply with the decision are encountered. the state must do it in a rea-
sonable period of time. This period shall be either proposed by the losing 
party and approved by the DSB or agreed between the parties within a 
forty-five day period. If no acceptable solution merges from this proce-
dure. a compulsory arbitration" must take place within ninety days from 
the adoption of the report by the DSB." 
The DSB has the duty to monitor the implementation of its decision. If, 
after six months following the decision ordering the implementation of 
the report, the member does not comply or incorrectly complies. the DSB 
has to put the item on the agenda and the member concerned must 
report the situation and the reasons for non-compliance. This monitoring 
procedure will last until full compliance with the decision has been 
reached. 
The final feature of the DSU implementation system is represented by 
the sanction available against a member for non-compliance with DSB 
decisions
8Q 
Compensation is not regarded as a normal result for a dispute 
and only interim compensation is regarded by the DSU as acceptable. 
Article 22.2 stipulates the possibility in case of failure of compliance 
with the decision to enter into negotiations with other parties (Q find a 
mutually acceptable compensation. In case of a further failure within 
twenty days, the. other party may request authorisation from the DSB or 
suspend concessions or other obligations covered by the agreement. This 
suspension must respect the principle of proportionality and is regarded 
as the ultimate means to enforce the original decision. Such a request to 
the DSB will be automatically enforceable"o as the rule of 'negative con-
sensus' also applies. Only a review on the level of the suspension of the 
concessions will become possible through an arbitration held by the 
Director-General or by the original panel of experts. 
87 See for instance European Communities (Regime jor the Importation, Sale and Distribution 
of Bananas) WTfDS27/ARB (Arbitration 1999) 
88 Alltogether. the length of the procedure must not exceed 15/18 months. In case of 
difficulties, the panel of experts can be referred to within 90 and they will act un-
der the DSB procedure 
89 Article 3.7 of the DSU. 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
Such sanctions must not conceal the real difficulty for the implementa-
tion of the DSB decisions. If such sanctions are held. the dispute settle-
ment system could be regarded as half a success. Moreover, it is unclear if 
the efficiency sought through the implementation phase will be sufficient 
to convince losing parties to comply with the decisions. Moreover the 
equality principle between WTO members will probably lose its strength 
when sanctions strike developed and developing countries. 
Since 1995, the implementation of a number of DSB decisions showed 
how the final settlement of a legal decision could still be highly political. 
The Banana case or the Beef meat (hormones) case opposing the United 
States of America and the European Union illustrated this situation. In the 
Banana case, the settlement of the dispute nearly went to a deadlock and 
the implementation phase generated a new dispute into the dispute.'l 
To conclude, the DSU can be regarded as a progress in so far it is not 
regarded as the only way to settle international trade disputes. The idea of 
balance is central to the system. Provided that any member state feels it is 
a progress, it can be regarded as a success. 
However, one must not hide some possible difficulties in the future. Cases 
like the Banana case or the Beef meat case illustrated" how developed 
countries could be reluctant to accept a final settlement when not only 
their trade but also their political interests are threatened. The WTO 
dispute settlement system cannot resolve all kinds of dispute including 
political ones. On the other hand, developing countries and least devel-
oped countries could consider the system as biased if it is unable to 
support their policies and to defend their own interests. Some developing 
countries have widely used the system 93 since 1995, and recorded some 
successes against developed countries,"' while most of the developing or 
least developed countries are absent from the dispute settlement system. 
For example, no African countries initiated a dispute for the first five years. 
The WTO dispute system works better than its predecessor but it would 
be a mistake to consider it as a miracle solution for all kinds of interna-
tional trade disputes! This does not prevent the coexistence of political or 
diplomatic settlements with legal settlements. 
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